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Cognitive control refers to a set of functions that allow for the execution of goal-directed behavior 
while remaining flexible to changes in task demands. Findings addressing whether or not 
awareness is necessary to elicit cognitive control are inconsistent, possibly stemming from the 
short stimulus presentation times employed in most masking paradigms, which could prevent 
sufficient processing time in some cases or provide a gist of the masked stimulus in other cases. 
The present study examined the necessity of awareness in cognitive control using Continuous Flash 
Suppression (CFS) to suppress stimulus awareness for periods of time longer than possible with 
other masking paradigms. Cognitive control was evoked using flanker arrow tasks in two 
experiments, wherein participants were asked to respond to a target arrow during congruent, 
incongruent, and no-flanker conditions. In the first experiment, one eye was presented with the 
flanker arrows while the opposite eye was presented with the target arrow alone (unmasked 
condition) or with CFS (masked condition). In the second experiment, CFS was presented in the 
same eye as the target arrow on every trial but the flanker arrows were displayed in either the same 
eye (unmasked condition) or opposite eye (masked condition) as the CFS and target arrow. Both 
experiments showed significantly slowed response times (RTs) for incongruent flankers relative to 
congruent flankers during unmasked trials, indicating a conflict effect. However, in masked trials, 
RTs were not significantly different between congruent and incongruent flanker conditions. These 
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meeting (Neuroscience 2013: Awareness is necessary for cognitive control. J. T. Lo Voi; Q. Wu; 
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(Wu Q, Lo Voi JTH, Lee TY, Mackie M-A, Wu Y and Fan J (2015). Interocular suppression 
prevents interference in a flanker task. Front. Psychol. 6:1110. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01110).  
 Where reasonable, I have changed text and figures in the present thesis to more closely 
reflect the paper in its initial form when presented as my first doctoral exam, the writing of which 
was entirely my own. However, as the body of the final published work is largely my writing and I 
contributed to the edits after peer-review, much of the content of this thesis will remain similar to 
the final published work. I retain joint copyright ownership of the text and figures in the final 
publication, along with the co-authors who are listed above (Frontiers’ copyright guidelines can be 
read at https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#author-guidelines).  
I am indebted to all of my former lab-mates and to Dr. Jin Fan, and so I would like to credit 
those who were instrumental in allowing this work to take its final shape. Listed below are the 
author contributions, acknowledgements, and disclaimers as seen in the final published work: 
vi  
“Qiong Wu and Jonathan Lo Voi contributed equally to experimental design, data 
collection, and drafting of the work. Thomas Lee contributed to data analysis, interpretation of 
data, and drafting of the work. Melissa-Ann Mackie contributed to the interpretation of data and 
drafting of the work.  Yanhong Wu contributed to the interpretation of data and drafting of the 
work. Jin Fan was involved in all of these aspects. All authors approved the final version to be 
published and agreed to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related 
to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and resolved. 
“We thank Dr.Julien Dubois from Christof Koch’s lab for providing MATLAB code to 
generate the Mondrian images for the CFS mask, and Drs. Elizabeth Chua and Tony Ro for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. Research reported in this publication was supported by the 
National Institute of Mental Health of the National Institutes of Health under Award Number R01 
MH094305 to Jin Fan. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not 
necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health. Yanhong Wu was 
supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology of China (2015CB351800).”  
  
vii  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract  . . . . . . . iv 
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . v 
Table of Contents . . . . . . . vii 
List of Figures  . . . . . . . viii 
Chapter 1: Introduction        1 
Chapter 2: General Materials and Methods     4 
Participants  . . . . . . . 4 
Apparatus . . . . . . . . 4 
Stimuli . . . . . . . . 5 
Data Analysis . . . . . . . . 5 
Chapter 3: Experiment 1        9 
Task Design . . . . . . . . 9 
Procedure . . . . . . . . 9 
Results  . . . . . . . . 11 
Reaction Times . . . . . . 11 
Accuracy . . . . . . . 13 
Discussion . . . . . . . . 14 
Chapter 4: Experiment 2        16 
Task Design . . . . . . . . 16 
Procedure . . . . . . . . 16 
Results  . . . . . . . . 17 
Reaction Times . . . . . . 17 
Accuracy . . . . . . . 19 
Discussion . . . . . . . . 20 
Chapter 5: General Discussion       22 
Limitations of CFS . . . . . . . 23 
Defining and Measuring Awareness . . . . . 25 
Conclusions . . . . . . . . 27 
 
References          28 
  
viii  
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1:  
The sequence of stimuli in each trial from Experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 2 (b) . 7 
 
Figure 2:  
Behavioral data from Experiment 1  . . . . . . 15 
 
Figure 3: 
Behavioral data from Experiment 2 . . . . . . . 21 
 
1  
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive control refers to those functions that mediate purposeful, goal-directed behavior 
while allowing for the flexibility to alter behavior with changing task demands (Fan, et al., 2009; 
Mackie, Van Dam, & Fan, 2013; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Cognitive 
control has been studied by manipulating stimuli and response conflict, as in various versions of 
Stroop tasks (Stroop, 1935), Eriksen flanker tasks (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), and Simon tasks 
(Simon and Berbaum, 1990). In these experiments, cognitive control is elicited by the presence of 
conflict between “congruent” stimuli and “incongruent” stimuli, the latter of which are usually 
accompanied by increased response times (RTs) and decreased accuracy. This difference in behavior 
between incongruent and congruent stimuli is defined as the “conflict effect” and is interpreted as an 
indication of increased cognitive control over attentional resources (Botvinick et al., 2001; Fan et al., 
2003, 2007, 2008). 
Research in cognitive neuroscience has made it apparent that the brain is capable of higher-
level processing of some information that never reaches awareness. A wide range of cognitive abilities 
have been demonstrated without awareness, including reading and arithmetic (Sklar et al., 2012; but 
see Kang, Blake, & Woodman, 2011),  monetary value assessment (Pessiglione, et al., 2007), and 
inhibitory control (van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009). It is possible that 
processing information outside of awareness may be possible due to inputs from early, subcortical 
visual pathways (Hall, West, & Szatmari, 2007; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1999; Pasley, Mayes, & 
Schultz, 2004; Troiani & Schultz, 2013). Though the full extent of information processing outside of 
awareness is largely unknown, the ability of the brain to perform higher cognitive tasks in the absence 
of awareness highlights the gaps in our knowledge regarding the function of conscious awareness. 
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It has previously been suggested that cognitive control is impossible without awareness 
(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Jack & Shallice, 2001). However, recent experiments implementing 
masking paradigms have challenged the view that awareness is necessary for cognitive control, by 
demonstrating cognitive control in subjects presented with masked stimuli. Results from these 
experiments have demonstrated unconscious activation of task sets using masked cues (Reuss, Kiesel, 
Kunde, & Hommel, 2011); unconscious interference from Stroop tasks (Klapp, 2007); and 
unconscious context effects on behavioral responses (Van Opstal, Calderon, Gevers, & Verguts, 
2011). Further, neuroimaging studies provide evidence for unconscious activation of brain regions, 
such as the anterior cingulate cortex (Ursu, Clark, Aizenstein, Stenger, & Carter, 2009) and prefrontal 
cortex (Lau & Passingham, 2007; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010), that are 
involved in cognitive control. However, other experiments have found that behavioral effects 
associated with cognitive control are not seen when stimuli do not reach awareness (Ansorge, Fuchs, 
Khalid, & Kunde, 2011; Boy, Husain, & Sumner, 2010; Frings & Wentura, 2008; Heinemann, Kunde, 
& Kiesel, 2009; Van den Bussche, Segers, & Reynvoet, 2008). 
 Though the discrepancies in the above findings may simply stem from the type of information 
being processed in each experiment (Boy, et al., 2010; Kunde, Reuss, & Kiesel, 2012; van Gaal & 
Lamme, 2012), it may also be an effect of the type of masking paradigm used. Many masking 
experiments employ briefly-presented stimuli that are quickly replaced with a mask, as is seen with 
backward-masking paradigms (Ansorge, et al., 2011; Rahnev, Huang, & Lau, 2012; Weibel, Giersch, 
Dehaene, & Huron, 2013). Though experiments utilizing briefly-presented stimuli have demonstrated 
the effects of cognitive control during unmasked trials, cognitive control is not always elicited during 
masked trials (Ansorge, et al., 2011; Frings & Wentura, 2008; Heinemann, et al., 2009). These 
observations have led to the conclusion that awareness of stimuli is necessary to elicit cognitive 
control. However, it is important to consider the type of mask used. Paradigms that present a mask 
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immediately after a briefly-presented stimulus may suppress awareness by re-focusing attention onto 
the mask (Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Van den Bussche, Hughes, Van Humbeeck, & 
Reynvoet, 2010; Visser, Bischof, & Di Lollo, 2004). If the masks in these paradigms cause attention to 
be re-focused, then there may be insufficient time to act upon the previously-presented stimulus. 
Because cognitive control depends on attention (Fan, et al., 2009; Mackie, et al., 2013; Wang, Liu, & 
Fan, 2011), the results from these masking experiments may only demonstrate the necessity of 
attention in eliciting cognitive control, rather than the necessity of awareness (though this assumes that 
attention and awareness are dissociable; see Cohen, Cavanagh, Chun, & Nakayama, 2012, and Koch & 
Tsuchiya, 2012). Thus, the experiments leave open the possibility that cognitive control can be elicited 
without awareness. 
The present two experiments aimed to better assess the relationship between cognitive control 
and awareness. It was hypothesized that cognitive control is a higher-level, “top-down” process that 
can only operate on information that has reached awareness. Cognitive control was measured in terms 
of conflict effects on behavioral responses during a flanker-arrow task. Awareness was manipulated 
using interocular suppression, specifically using continuous flash suppression (CFS). CFS is a 
powerful masking tool in which a dynamic image composed of flashing multi-colored “Mondrian” 
patterns is presented to one eye, which prevents awareness of a stable image presented to the opposite 
eye (Fang and He, 2005; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). Because CFS allows for suppression of 
awareness for longer periods of time compared to other masking paradigms (over seconds, rather than 
milliseconds; Shimaoka and Kaneko, 2011; Stein and Sterzer, 2011), it is ideal for investigating the 
role of awareness in higher-order cognitive tasks that likely require longer processing times (Peremen 
and Lamy, 2014; Yang et al., 2014). Thus, if the present experiments fail to demonstrate conflict 
effects during masked trials of a flanker task, then support is given to the idea that awareness of 
stimuli is necessary to elicit cognitive control.  
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CHAPTER 2: GENERAL MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
Forty-two individuals (19 females, mean age in years ± SD, 21.74 ± 4.96) participated in 
Experiment 1 and forty individuals (28 females, mean age in years ± SD, 21.31 ± 5.33) participated in 
Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, 11 participants were excluded because of errors of omission and 7 
participants were excluded because of unsuccessful CFS masking (final N = 24, 11 females, mean age 
in years ± SD, 21.38 ± 4.53). In Experiment 2, 10 participants were excluded because of errors of 
omission and 5 participants were excluded because of unsuccessful CFS masking (final N = 25, 16 
females, mean age in years ± SD, 21.5 ± 5.78). Participants were recruited from the Psychology 101 
subject pool at Queens College and were granted class credits for their participation. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review 
Board of Queens College of the City University of New York. All participants signed informed 
consent forms prior to the start of the experimental procedure.  
Apparatus 
 A stereoscopic shutter goggle system (ELSA wired 3D goggles with attached head-
strap) was used to display the stimuli and mask. The goggle system allowed independent presentation 
of stimuli to each eye and eliminated the need for a head and chin rest, as is seen with stereoscopic 
mirror setups that are commonly used in CSF experiments (Carmel, Arcaro, Kastner, & Hasson, 
2010). The screen resolution for each eye was 800 x 600 pixels. 
The experiment was presented using MATLAB R2010b software with Psychophysics Toolbox 
Version-3 (Brainard, 1997) installed on a Mac Pro 5.1 computer running OSX 10.7. The stimuli were 
sent to the goggles using a stereo-mode defined in the functions included with the Psychophysics 
Toolbox. Each goggle eyepiece received alternating frames, with one eye receiving even frames and 
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the other receiving odd frames (total refresh rate of 30 Hz for each eyepiece). Viewing distance to 
each eyepiece was approximately 2.5 cm. 
Stimuli 
 The experiment used a variation of the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) with 
arrows serving as targets and flankers (each approximately 2.8° of visual angle). The stimuli are 
illustrated in Figure 1.  A central fixation cross of 16 x 16 pixels was presented to both eyes for the 
duration of the experiment. Participants viewed a central target arrow pointing either to the left or 
right, which on some trials could be presented simultaneously with four flanker arrows. The arrows 
(RGB values = 103) were presented at a darker contrast than the gray background (RGB values = 
128). The arrow head was approximately 3.3 times larger than the arrow base to allow for quick 
discrimination of direction. The target arrow’s location always overlapped with the location of the 
fixation cross. Depending on the trial, the target and flanker arrows could appear in either the same eye 
or in different eyes. To facilitate the fusing of the images presented to each eye, a square border of 
alternating black and white bands was presented to both eyes throughout the experiment.  
CFS was used to mask the flanker arrows in each version of the experiment. The Mondrian 
images comprising the CFS mask were a set of multicolored overlapping ovals that filled the space 
inside the square border and were cycled at a rate of 10 Hz (modeled after the CFS mask in Tsuchiya 
and Koch, 2005). Ovals were used due to concerns that the presence of sharp angles could interfere 
with discriminating the sharp angles of the target arrow. CSF was used because it allowed a longer 
duration of masking time, ensuring that any potential lack of flanker conflict could not be explained 
away by an insufficient amount of time to process the conflicting information. 
Data analysis 
 Participants were excluded from further analysis if they made omission errors for more than 
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20% of trials in any run. Participants were also excluded if they performed above chance and reported 
“yes” during a fifth run that was included to determine if participants were aware of the flanker 
arrows, despite the presence of the CSF mask.  
  Mean RTs and accuracy were calculated for each trial type. Trials with incorrect responses 
were excluded from the analysis of RTs. For both RT and accuracy, we conducted a two-way within-
subjects ANOVA with flanker condition (no flankers, congruent flankers, incongruent flankers) and 
presence of CFS mask (CFS mask vs no CFS mask) as within-subjects factors. For factors and 
interactions where assumption of sphericity is violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction will be used 
and adjusted degrees of freedom and p values will be reported. Significance level was set at an α of 






Figure 1. The sequence of stimuli in each trial from Experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 2 (b). In 
each experiment, a fixation cross was shown to both eyes. One eye was then presented with a central 
target arrow that appeared in the same location as the fixation cross, while one of three flanker 
conditions were presented: no flankers, congruent flankers (same direction as target), or incongruent 
flankers (opposite direction of target). (a) Flanker arrows were presented to the eye opposite the target 
arrow. Mondrians (CFS) were presented to the same eye as the target arrow only during masked trials. 
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(b) Mondrians were presented to the same eye as the target arrow during each trial. During unmasked 
trials, the flankers were presented to the same eye as the target arrow and Mondrians. During masked 
trials, the flanker arrows appeared in the eye opposite the target arrow and Mondrians. After the 
presentation of the target arrow in each experiment, Mondrians were presented alone to prevent 





CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Task Design  
 The aim of this experiment was to test for evidence of cognitive control acting upon conflicting 
information that is presented outside of awareness.  
Figure 1a illustrates the stimuli in an example trial. The flanker arrows were presented to the 
eye opposite the dynamic Mondrian images. Because the target arrow was not meant to be masked by 
CFS, it was presented to the same eye as the Mondrian images, and was discernable among the 
Mondrian images. In unmasked trials (no Mondrian images present), flanker arrows were presented to 
the eye opposite the target arrow for consistency, which additionally ensured that a flanker conflict 
effect still would be seen even when flankers were presented to the opposite eye from the target. 
Because the flanker arrows would not be visible during masked trials, trials without flanker arrows 
were used as a control instead of trials with neutral flankers (e.g. bars without arrow-heads) for both 
masked and unmasked trials. For unmasked trials (no CFS), it was predicted that a conflict effect 
(increased RTs and decreased accuracy) would be seen for incongruent flankers relative to congruent 
flankers or no flankers. For masked trials (CFS present), it was predicted that there would be no 
conflict effect when comparing all three flanker conditions.  
 
Procedure 
 Prior to the start of the experiment, participants were instructed to watch the fixation cross at 
all times. They were told only to indicate the direction of the central target arrow that overlapped with 
the location of the fixation cross as quickly and accurately as possible, and to ignore any other arrows 
or colorful images presented. The goggle head-strap was adjusted for each participant’s head and the 
lights were dimmed to allow optimal viewing. Responses were collected using the left and right arrow 
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keys of a standard keyboard. 
The experiment was divided into four runs of the experimental task, with 96 trials per run. 
Each trial lasted for 4 seconds, for a total of 384 seconds (6.4 minutes) per run. Participants were given 
the option of taking a break after each run. The experiment was divided into masked and unmasked 
conditions, each of which were further subdivided into no-flanker, congruent flanker, and incongruent 
flanker conditions, totaling 6 conditions. Each condition was presented an equal number of times, and 
the order was randomized within each run.  A 30-second fixation period was present at the start and 
end of each run. At the start of each trial, a fixation cross was presented in isolation for a jittered 
duration ranging from 200 - 1200 ms. Then the flanker arrows and target arrow appeared, along with 
the CFS mask in masked trials, for 1200 ms. This was followed by 500 ms of the CFS mask and the 
fixation cross (no arrows) during masked trials, or the fixation cross alone during unmasked trials. The 
trial would conclude with the fixation cross presented for a jittered duration of 1100 – 2200 ms, for a 
total trial time of 4000 ms (Figure 1a). During trials with the CFS mask, the mask and target were 
presented to one eye, while the flankers or fixation alone were presented to the opposite eye. Trials 
were counterbalanced such that there was an equal probability of the target appearing in either eye. 
The presentation of the mask for 500 ms after the target presentation was used to ensure the flanker 
arrows did not leave a negative afterimage that could influence responses, as was reported in pilot 
sessions. Responses could be recorded at any time during the target presentation or the 500 ms 
following the target presentation. 
Fifth Run.  A fifth run was included to assess whether participants were aware of the flanker 
arrows, despite the CFS mask. The stimuli in this fifth run were identical to those in the other four runs 
of the experiment, with the addition of two questions after every trial. Participants were instructed to 
ignore the target arrow for the fifth run, and to instead watch for the flanker arrows and respond to the 
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two question prompts. The first question asked whether the flanker arrows pointed to the left or the 
right. This question was presented after all trials, including trials where the flankers were masked and 
trials where no flankers were present. Participants were told to choose whichever direction “felt right” 
if no flankers were seen. The second question, presented immediately after the first question, asked 
whether or not participants saw any flanker arrows. Participants were told to respond “yes” even if 
they vaguely saw flanker arrows or if they thought they may have caught a glimpse of the flankers but 
were unsure. This instruction was given to decrease the variability of report criteria among participants 
(Merikle, 1984). The instruction was added under the assumption that participants’ ability to recognize 
that something was presented falls under the category of subjective awareness, even if they could not 
objectively identify what was presented (Sekar, Findley, Poeppel, & Llinas, 2013). The purpose of 
using both objective and subjective measures to assess flanker visibility was twofold: to have two 
reference points for defining awareness of the flankers and to look for effects similar to “blindsight” 
patients, where individuals subjectively report an inability to see stimuli but nevertheless show 
objective behavioral effects of the stimuli (Hesselmann, Hebart, & Malach, 2011; Marcel, 1998; 
Poppel, Held, & Frost, 1973).  
Results 
No blindsight effects (i.e. correct forced-choice responses to flanker arrow direction despite 
subjective reports that the flanker arrows were unseen) were found for the fifth run; participants 
performed above chance on forced-choice flanker discrimination only on trials where they indicated 
having subjectively seen the flankers. 
Reaction Times. Figure 2a illustrates the mean RTs and standard errors (SEs) for each trial type. 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was satisfied for congruency and the 
interaction between congruency and the CFS mask. Significant main effects were found for both CFS 
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(F (1, 23) = 26.95, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54) and flanker congruency (F (2, 46) = 41.53, p < .001, ηp
2 = .64). 
A significant interaction was found between congruency and CFS (F (2, 46) = 39.64, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.63), indicating the strength of the flanker conflict effect differed as a function of CFS presence. 
Planned simple contrasts were performed to investigate the interaction effect. There were significant 
interactions between unmasked and masked conditions when comparing the no-flanker and 
incongruent trials, F (1, 23) = 57.36, p < .001, ηp
2 = .71, and the congruent and incongruent trials, F 
(1, 23) = 56.58, p < .001, ηp
2 = .71. The RT difference between incongruent trials and no-flanker trials 
(and similarly between congruent and incongruent trials) was significantly greater during unmasked 
trials than masked trials.  
 Analyses of simple main effects were carried out to investigate the differences between flanker 
congruency conditions when split into masked (CFS) and unmasked (no CFS) conditions. The results 
reveal significantly increased RTs for unmasked congruent trials relative to unmasked no-flanker 
trials, t (23) = 3.20, p = .004; significantly increased RTs for unmasked incongruent trials relative to 
unmasked no-flanker trials, t (23) = 8.32, p < .001; and significantly increased RTs for unmasked 
incongruent trials relative to unmasked congruent trials t (23) = 7.62, p < .001. No significant 
differences were found when comparing masked congruent and masked no-flanker trials, t (23) = 1.37, 
p = .185, masked incongruent and masked no-flanker trials, t (23) = 1.68, p = .106, or masked 
incongruent trials and masked congruent trials, t (23) = -.11, p = .911. RTs were not significantly 
different when comparing unmasked no-flanker trials to masked no-flanker trials, t (23) = 1.67, p = 
.108. RTs were significantly increased for unmasked congruent trials as compared to masked 
congruent, t (23) = 3.02, p = .006, and for unmasked incongruent trials as compared to masked 
incongruent trials, t (23) = 7.26, p < .001. These results suggest that RTs were not significantly 




Figure 2b illustrates the mean accuracy and SEs for each trial type.  The assumption of 
sphericity was violated for flanker congruency (p < .001) and the interaction between congruency and 
CFS (p < .001), and therefore a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. Significant main effects 
were found for both CFS, F (1, 23) = 6.80, p = .016, ηp
2 = .23, and congruency, F (1.30, 28.90) = 6.46, 
p = .011, ηp
2 = .22. A significant interaction was found between congruency and CFS, F (1.25, 28.82) 
= 8.04, p = .005, ηp
2 = .84. Planned simple contrasts were performed to investigate the interaction. 
There were significant interactions between the unmasked and masked conditions when comparing 
incongruent and no-flanker trials, F (1, 23) = 9.94, p = .004, ηp
2 = .86, and incongruent and congruent 
trials, F (1, 23) = 7.59, p = .011, ηp
2 = .75. The interactions indicated that the extent to which accuracy 
was lower during incongruent trials as compared to either no-flanker trials was significantly greater for 
unmasked trials than masked trials, and the extent to which accuracy was lower during incongruent 
trials as compared to congruent trials was significantly greater for unmasked trials than masked trials. 
To investigate the differences between congruency conditions when split into masked and 
unmasked conditions, analyses of simple main effects were conducted. The results revealed 
significantly lower accuracy for unmasked incongruent trials relative to unmasked no-flanker trials, t 
(23) = -2.98, p = .007, and significantly lower accuracy for unmasked incongruent trials relative to 
unmasked congruent trials, t (23) = -2.83, p = .009. No significant difference was found between 
unmasked no-flanker trials and unmasked congruent trials, t (23) = .89, p = .381. No significant 
difference in accuracy was found when comparing masked no-flanker trials and masked congruent 
trials, t (23) < .01, p > .999, masked no-flanker trials and masked incongruent trials, t (23) = -.56, p = 
.582, or masked congruent trials and masked incongruent trials, t (23) = -.43, p = .670. No significant 
difference in accuracy was found between unmasked no-flanker trials and masked no-flanker trials, t 
(23) = .56, p = .582, or unmasked congruent trials and masked congruent trials, t (23) = -.36, p = .724; 
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but accuracy was lowered significantly for unmasked incongruent trials compared to masked 
incongruent trials, t (23) = -2.92, p = .008. These results suggest that accuracy dropped only during 
incongruent trials in the unmasked condition. 
Discussion 
These RT and accuracy results demonstrate that flanker arrows elicit a conflict effect only in 
trials without the CFS mask. The typical pattern of incongruent flanker effects appeared only during 
unmasked trials, suggesting that conflict is only seen when there is awareness of the flanker arrows.  
The results also demonstrate that a conflict effect can be elicited even when the target and 
flanker arrows are presented to different eyes, which was essential for testing the hypothesis. It is 
worth noting that unmasked congruent flankers led to significantly increased RTs compared to masked 
congruent flankers. This is likely because even congruent flankers served as a distraction when they 





Figure 2. Behavioral data from Experiment 1. (a) Reaction time (RT) and (b) accuracy are 
illustrated for Experiment 1. (a) Incongruent trials without CFS (unmasked condition) led to increased 
RTs than no-flanker trials without CFS, congruent trials without CFS, and incongruent trials with CFS. 
Additionally, congruent trials without CFS led to increased RTs than no-flanker trials without CFS and 
congruent trials with CFS (b) Incongruent trials without CFS led to lower accuracy than no-flanker 
trials without CFS, congruent trials without CFS, and incongruent trials with CFS.  






CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Task Design  
 Though Experiment 1 would allow for the quantification of a flanker conflict effect when the 
flankers were presented to the eye opposite the target arrow, it would not address the possibility that 
differences in responses could be due to the Mondrian images themselves, since CFS was not present 
on unmasked trials. As such, if no conflict effect was seen for masked trials in Experiment 1, it would 
be unclear if this was due to successful masking of the flankers; or, instead, if some property of the 
Mondrian images makes it easier to ignore information around the target. Indeed, a high perceptual 
load can aid in the suppression of irrelevant distractor information (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 
2004). As a result, it is possible that no conflict effect would be seen in Experiment 1 during trials with 
CFS, even if flankers outside of awareness could theoretically elicit a conflict effect. Experiment 2 
better controls for this possibility by presenting the Mondrians on each trial while manipulating 
whether the flankers appear in the same eye (unmasked) or opposite eye (masked) as the Mondrians 
(Watanabe, et al., 2011; Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 2013).  
The experimental stimuli, including CFS mask, arrows, fixation cross, and frame, were all 
identical to Experiment 1, with the exception that the flanker arrows appeared in the same eye as the 
target arrow and Mondrians on half of the trials. This ensured that the flanker arrows would be visible 
on such trials, despite the Mondrians always being present. We predicted that RTs would increase and 
accuracy would decrease for incongruent trials, but this conflict effect would only be seen when the 
flanker arrows appeared in the same eye as the Mondrians and target arrow (unmasked trials).  
 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure was nearly identical to Experiment 1, with the following 
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differences. Instead of masked and unmasked trials two flanker-eye conditions were presented. In the 
same-eye condition, the flanker arrows appeared in the same eye as the Mondrians and target arrow. In 
the different-eye condition, the flanker arrows appeared in the eye opposite the Mondrians and target 
arrow. This condition was equivalent to the masked trials of Experiment 1.  This manipulation resulted 
in 2 flanker-eye (same-eye vs. different eye) x 3 flanker type (no flanker, congruent flanker, and 
incongruent flanker) conditions.  
 At the onset of each trial, the fixation cross duration was jittered for 800 – 1800 ms, followed 
by presentation of the Mondrians with the target (and flankers when applicable) for 1200 ms. The 
Mondrians and fixation cross were then presented for 500 ms, and the trial concluded with the fixation 
cross duration jittered for 500 – 1500 ms, for a total trial time of 4000 ms (Figure 1b).  It is worth 
pointing out that the no-flanker trials in both the same-eye and different-eye conditions were identical, 
and so one-third of all trials presented only the target arrow and CFS mask to one eye. In all other 
respects Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1. 
Results 
Similar to Experiment 1, no blindsight effects were found for the fifth run. Participants again 
performed above chance on forced-choice flanker discrimination only on trials where they indicated 
having subjectively seen the flankers. 
Reaction Times. Figure 3a illustrates the mean RTs and SEs for each trial type. The 
assumption of sphericity was satisfied for both congruency and the interaction between congruency 
and the flanker-eye conditions. Significant main effects were found for flanker-eye, F (1, 23) = 63.26, 
p <.001, ηp
2 = .73, and for congruency, F (2, 46) = 46.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = .67. A significant interaction 
was found between congruency and flanker-eye, F (2, 46) = 64.35, p < .001, ηp
2 = .74, indicating the 
strength of the flanker conflict effect differed as a function of flanker-eye. Planned simple contrasts 
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were performed to investigate the interaction. There were significant interactions between the same-
eye (unmasked) and different-eye (masked) conditions when comparing incongruent and no-flanker 
trials, F (1, 23) = 82.57, p < .001, ηp
2 = .78, and incongruent and congruent trials, F (1, 23) = 85.05, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .79. The interactions indicated that the extent to which RTs were greater during 
incongruent trials relative to no-flanker trials was significantly greater during the same-eye condition 
than the different-eye condition, and the extent to RTs were greater during incongruent trials relative 
to congruent trials was significantly greater during the same-eye condition than the different-eye 
condition. 
 Analyses of simple main effects were conducted to investigate the differences between 
congruency conditions when split into the same-eye (unmasked) and different-eye (masked) 
conditions. The results revealed significantly increased RTs for same-eye incongruent trials relative to 
same-eye no-flanker trials the, t (23) = 9.46, p < .001, and for same-eye incongruent trials relative to 
same-eye congruent trials, t (23) = 10.27, p < .001; but no significant difference was found between 
same-eye congruent trials and same-eye no-flanker trials, t (23) = 2.00, p = .057. No significant 
differences in RTs were found when comparing different-eye congruent trials and different-eye no-
flanker trials, t (23) = .66, p = .515, different-eye incongruent trials and different-eye no-flanker trials, 
t (23) = .25, p = .804, or different-eye incongruent trials and different-eye congruent trials, t (23) = -
.40, p = .691. RTs were significantly increased for same-eye congruent trials compared to different-
eye congruent trials, t (23) = 2.88, p = .008, and for same-eye incongruent trials as compared to 
different-eye incongruent trials, t (23) = 10.13, p < .001; but no significant difference was found 
between same-eye no-flanker trials and different-eye no-flanker trials, t (23) = 1.55, p = .134. These 
results suggest that RTs were not significantly different across the three flanker trials for the different-




 Figure 3b illustrates the mean accuracy and SEs for each trial type. The assumption of 
sphericity was not satisfied for flanker congruency (p = .029), and therefore a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was used. Significant main effects were found for flanker-eye, F (1, 23) = 5.47, p = .028, 
and flanker congruency, F (1.57, 36.10) = 6.03, p = .009. The assumption of sphericity was satisfied 
for the interaction between congruency and flanker-eye. A significant interaction was found between 
congruency and flanker-eye, F (2, 46) = 7.16, p = .002, ηp
2 = .92. Planned simple contrasts were 
performed to investigate the interaction. There were significant interactions between the same-eye 
(unmasked) and different-eye (masked) conditions when comparing incongruent and no-flanker trials, 
F (1, 23) = 9.80, p = .005, ηp
2 = .85, and incongruent and congruent trials, F (1, 23) = 9.32, p = .006, 
ηp
2 = .83. The interactions indicated that the extent to which accuracy was lower during incongruent 
trials as compared to no-flanker trials was significantly greater for the same-eye condition than the 
different-eye condition, and the extent to which accuracy was lower for incongruent trials compared to 
congruent trials was significantly greater for same-eye condition than for the different-eye condition. 
Analyses of simple main effects were conducted to investigate the differences between congruency 
conditions when split into different-eye (masked) and same-eye (unmasked) conditions. The results 
revealed significantly lower accuracy for same-eye incongruent trials relative to same-eye no-flanker 
trials, t (23) = -3.10, p = .005, and for same-eye incongruent trials relative to same-eye congruent 
trials, t (23) = -3.23, p = .004; though accuracy was not significantly different between same-eye 
congruent trials and same-eye no-flanker trials, t (23) = .705, p = .488. No significant differences in 
accuracy were found when comparing the different-eye congruent trials and different-eye no-flanker 
trials, t (23) = 1.30, p = .206, the different-eye incongruent trials and different-eye no-flanker trials, t 
(23) = 1.66, p = .110, or the different-eye incongruent trials and different-eye congruent trials, t (23) = 
.43, p = .670. No significant differences in accuracy were found when comparing same-eye no-flanker 
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trials and different-eye no-flanker trials, t (23) = .77, p = .450, or when comparing same-eye congruent 
trials with different-eye congruent trials, t (23) = -.01, p = .996; but accuracy was significantly lower 
for same-eye incongruent trials compared to different-eye incongruent trials, t (23) = -3.51, p = .002. 
These results suggest that accuracy dropped only during incongruent trials in the same-eye condition. 
Discussion 
The results indicate that a conflict effect, as assessed by both RTs and accuracy, is not elicited 
when the flanker arrows are shown to the eye opposite the CFS mask and target arrow (masked 
condition), but a conflict occurs when the flanker arrows are shown to the same eye as the CFS mask 
and target arrow (unmasked condition). The fact that there is no significant difference in RT between 
unmasked no-flanker trials and unmasked congruent trials in Experiment 2, despite significantly 
increased RTs for unmasked congruent trials relative to unmasked no-flanker trials in Experiment 1, 
might seem to suggest that the Mondrian images comprising the CFS mask aided in ignoring the 
flankers. Thus, the concerns motivating the implementation of Experiment 2 were warranted. 
However, because RTs increased and accuracy decreased significantly for incongruent trials in the 
same-eye condition (indicating a conflict effect), the lack of a conflict effect in the different-eye 
(masked) condition cannot be accounted for solely by the effects of the Mondrians. Rather, because 
the Mondrians were present for both masked and unmasked trials, the lack of a conflict effect in 
masked trials must result from the masking properties of CFS. The results thus corroborate the results 
from Experiment 1 and suggest that cognitive control is not elicited when participants are unaware of 





Figure 3. Behavioral data from Experiment 2. (a) Reaction time (RT) and (b) accuracy are 
illustrated for Experiment 2. Incongruent trials in the same-eye (unmasked) condition led to increased 
RTs than no-flanker trials in the same-eye condition, congruent trials in the same-eye condition, and 
incongruent trials in the different-eye condition. Additionally, congruent trials in the same-eye 
condition led to increased RTs than congruent trials in the different-eye condition. Incongruent trials in 
the same-eye condition also led to lower accuracy than no-flanker trials in the same-eye condition, 
congruent trials in the same-eye condition, and incongruent trials in the different-eye condition.  
* significant at α = .05; ** significant at α = .01; *** significant at α = .001 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 If cognitive control could be elicited while masking awareness with CFS, a flanker conflict 
effect would be expected during masked trials of both experiments. However, the results from both 
experiments demonstrate that the flanker arrows elicited a conflict effect only in those trials without 
the CFS mask. No significant differences in RTs or accuracy were found in Experiment 1 for any of 
the masked flanker trials. However, RTs were significantly increased and accuracy decreased for 
unmasked incongruent trials. Likewise, no significant differences in RTs or accuracy were found in 
Experiment 2 for any of the different-eye (masked) flanker conditions, although RTs increased and 
accuracy decreased for the same-eye (unmasked) incongruent trials. The results provide evidence that 
cognitive control is elicited only when visual awareness of conflicting information is not suppressed.  
 Because attention and awareness are closely related, it is important to control for attention 
when manipulating awareness (Cohen, Cavanagh, Chun, & Nakayama, 2012; Marchetti, 2012; van 
Boxtel, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2010). Experiment 2 demonstrated that the lack of conflict during masked 
trials was not due to the Mondrians diverting attention from the flanker arrows. Because CFS was 
always present in Experiment 2, no conflict effect would be expected in the same-eye (unmasked) 
condition if the results were a result of the Mondrians absorbing attention. However, because a conflict 
effect was seen in the same-eye condition, the lack of conflict during masked trials was likely due to 
suppression of visual awareness by CFS. 
 The results of these two experiments do not support earlier work demonstrating cognitive 
control effects without awareness (Lau & Passingham, 2007; Rahnev, et al., 2012; Reuss, et al., 2011; 
van Gaal, et al., 2010; van Gaal, et al., 2009) while corroborating work that shows a lack of cognitive 
control without awareness (Ansorge, et al., 2011; Boy, et al., 2010; Frings & Wentura, 2008; 
Heinemann, et al., 2009; Van den Bussche, et al., 2008). This may be due to differences in the specific 
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cognitive control mechanisms tested in these studies (for a review, see Kunde, Reuss, & Kiesel, 2012). 
The present study elicited conflict using geometric shapes, i.e. the target and flanker arrows. It may 
not be possible to elicit shape-based conflict processing outside of awareness, as was found in the 
present study, despite the ability to elicit other forms of cognitive control. Therefore, it is important to 
note that these results may generalize only to the processing of conflicting shape information. More 
work is required to see if other paradigms, such as the Stroop task, can elicit a conflict effect while 
using CFS to mask stimuli. 
Limitations of CFS 
 The possibility remains that the lack of conflict during masked trials is due to the presentation 
of the flanker and target arrows to separate eyes. Dichoptic presentations, which are necessary for CFS 
experiments, can elevate stimulus contrast thresholds and decrease flanker effect sizes (Maehara, 
Huang, & Hess, 2010). Further, masking low-contrast stimuli with CFS prevents primary visual cortex 
(V1) activation, similar to when no stimulus is presented at all (Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 2013). 
The lack of conflict during masked trials in the present study may thus reflect a change in contrast 
threshold of the flanker arrows (which were presented at a low-contrast for these experiments) and 
thus result in an inability of flanker information to reach V1. Because V1 has been implicated in shape 
contour processing (Kourtzi, Betts, Sarkheil, & Welchman, 2005; Li & Gilbert, 2002; Li, Piëch, & 
Gilbert, 2006), the lack of a conflict effect during masked trials in the present experiment may simply 
reflect a lack of shape processing (though shape processing may be seen in patients with V1 lesions; 
Marcel, 1998). Activation of V1 is likely a prerequisite for visual awareness (Koivisto, Mäntylä, & 
Silvanto, 2010; Tong, 2003), and so a lack of V1 activation could simply suggest successful masking. 
However, if CFS prevents low-contrast shape information from reaching V1, then the present results 
may not necessarily indicate that awareness is necessary for cognitive control. Rather, there may be a 
threshold of visual processing that needs to be reached, with or without awareness, to produce a 
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conflict effect that elicits a greater degree of cognitive control.  
Despite the evidence that CFS prevents information from reaching V1, information masked by 
CFS can be processed. Studies have demonstrated effects of masked stimuli during CFS, including 
processing of nude bodies (Jiang, Costello, Fang, Huang, & He, 2006) and performing simple math 
and reading (Sklar, et al., 2012). Subcortical pathways that bypass V1 may allow certain types of 
stimuli to affect behavioral responses even when masked by CFS. Recent fMRI work has implicated 
the involvement of subcortical pathways in processing face and object information masked by CFS 
and binocular rivalry (Fang & He, 2005; Pasley, et al., 2004; Troiani & Schultz, 2013). Thus, if 
subcortical processing is possible during CFS, the present results may indicate that subcortical 
processing is not sufficient to affect brain regions implicated in cognitive control, such as the anterior 
cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex (Fan, et al., 2011; Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004; Ursu, et al., 
2009; van Veen & Carter, 2002), or that subcortical structures cannot process flanker arrow shape 
information. However, neuroimaging work will be required to address this possibility within the 
present paradigm. 
One possible avenue for future research is to perform the present experiments using a different 
form of masking, in particular one that selectively interferes with only regions further up in the visual 
processing stream. A newer technique referred to as “chromatic flicker fusion” (CFF) simultaneously 
presents two isoluminant and opposing colored stimuli to both eyes. The stimuli flicker in counter-
phase with each other at a temporal frequency above the flicker fusion threshold (∼30 Hz) 
(Hoshiyama et al., 2006). Although CFS and CFF can render stimuli subjectively invisible with 
supposedly comparable effectiveness, unconscious information that never leaves the occipital lobe 
using CFS can show effects within temporal and frontal regions using CFF (Fogelson et al., 2014). 
Thus, CFF may be a more sensitive technique for measuring unconscious high-level processing than 
CFS. Performing similar experiments as the ones outlined here with different masking paradigms and 
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with different categories of stimuli, in conjunction with functional neuroimaging techniques, may help 
shed further light on the necessary and sufficient conditions for information to have a measurable 
effect on cognitive control. 
Defining and Measuring Awareness 
It is possible that the inconsistencies in previous work addressing cognitive control without 
awareness are due to the methods used to manipulate awareness. Different masking paradigms can 
lead to opposing conclusions, despite it being agreed that participant awareness is successfully 
suppressed with each paradigm (Almeida, Pajtas, Mahon, Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2013). It has been 
suggested that stronger masking paradigms are more effective for suppressing awareness (Almeida, et 
al., 2013; Desender & Van den Bussche, 2012). However, this suggestion seems to be based on the 
assumption that any sub-threshold processing that may be seen with weaker masking paradigms 
necessarily constitutes awareness, which may not be true (Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001).  
In addition, currently there is no completely reliable means of measuring awareness. Although 
subjective and objective measures are often used to test participant awareness, they both depend on 
strong underlying assumptions regarding which behaviors and responses constitute awareness. 
Objective forced-choice measures assume that accuracy above chance indicates awareness 
(Hesselmann, et al., 2011; Van Opstal, et al., 2011). However, both hemi-neglect and blindsight 
patients are able to discriminate objects above chance in forced-choice measures, despite their 
apparent lack of awareness of those objects (Driver & Mattingley, 1998; Marcel, 1998), and there is 
evidence for similar effects in healthy groups (Hesselmann, et al., 2011). Forced-choice measures 
therefore may be too conservative to serve as indicators of awareness when used alone and may 
conflate sub-threshold processing with access to awareness (Merikle, et al., 2001).  
Subjective reports, in contrast, involve a free response by participants to indicate some feature 
of a masked stimulus (e.g. its presence or identity). Subjective measures define awareness as a 
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participant’s ability to successfully identify a stimulus or otherwise freely indicate that something was 
seen (Dienes & Scott, 2005). However, there are unique concerns with this approach. Participants 
often have differences in their criteria for reporting awareness (Merikle, 1984; Persaud, McLeod, & 
Cowey, 2007), and it is possible that participants are aware of more than they can verbally report due 
to limits of attention or memory (Block, 2011; DeGardelle, 2009; Fei-Fei & Perona, 2007; Li, 
Vanrullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002; Sperling, 1960; van Boxtel, et al., 2010). Thus, more objective 
measures of defining awareness, such as the behavioral data in the present experiments, may be seen 
as more robust and replicable, though at the risk of being overly strict in defining awareness. 
  The above issues highlight the difficulty in defining awareness in a way that separates it from 
related functions. Conscious visual awareness is not necessarily an all-or-none, discrete phenomenon 
that serves as the culmination of processing in particular brain regions or networks (Cohen, et al., 
2012; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Mole, 2008; Tallon-Baudry, 2011; Tononi & Koch, 2008; van 
Boxtel, et al., 2010). Masking paradigms may operate at different stages of visual processing 
(Almeida, et al., 2013; Troiani & Schultz, 2013), making it difficult to determine which method is the 
best for manipulating awareness. Sensory input, working memory, internal self-representation, and 
attention are all components of awareness, and interrupting any of those processes will cause an 
interruption in awareness (Marchetti, 2012). Because all masking paradigms interrupt further 
processing of visual information at some stage (otherwise they would not prevent visual awareness), 
the cutoff for determining when awareness “happens” is arbitrary.  Although it is useful to illustrate 
the degree of processing that is possible when one component of awareness is suppressed, whether or 
not the processing should be considered “awareness” is a matter of semantics. In the present 
experiments, if there had been a blindsight-like effect during the fifth runs as well as a positive result 
on masked trials, it may have been possible to argue that the participants had in fact been aware of the 





 Though the results of the present study could suggest that awareness is necessary for cognitive 
control, as suggested by previous work (Ansorge, et al., 2011; Boy, et al., 2010; Frings & Wentura, 
2008; Heinemann, et al., 2009; Van den Bussche, et al., 2008), they do not allow definitive 
conclusions. The present results indicate that cognitive control, in the form of conflict resolution, does 
not appear to be involved when masking flanker arrows, even if the masked stimuli are presented for a 
duration of time that should allow for sufficient processing time.  
 Based on the above considerations, awareness is currently too vague of a concept to be 
manipulated unambiguously using one preferred masking technique. Because awareness may broadly 
refer to how an information-processing system like the brain integrates and understands its own 
processing as it interacts with the world (Crick & Koch, 2003; Metzinger, 2000), it may be the case 
that awareness is a general term that encompasses several related and integrated functions (Marchetti, 
2012). Therefore, future research should address which brain regions and functions are suppressed 
when using different masking paradigms, rather than treating “awareness” as a fundamental process. 
Neuroimaging techniques may elucidate which functions are interrupted during different masking 
paradigms (Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 2013) as well as alternative processing pathways (Troiani & 
Schultz, 2013). Likewise, assessing neural differences during objective and subjective measures of 
awareness may lead to a more concrete operational definition of awareness (Hesselmann, et al., 2011). 
Until more work is done, it is unclear if cognitive control can be elicited without awareness. However, 
the present results suggest that cognitive control cannot be elicited when CFS is used to prevent 
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